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INTEGRATION AND COMMUNICATION OF CSR PRINCIPLES BY IKEA. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF AND ON EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In spite of the rising influence of NGOs, the impact of CSR implementation and 
communication on NGOs’ perceptions and attitudes is rarely evoked. Moreover, empirical 
studies generally take into account one category of stakeholder at a time, preventing analysts 
from examining the likely differential impacts of CSR on distinct categories of stakeholders.  
 
In this context, this paper proposes (1) to analyze how different external and ubiquitous 
stakeholders can influence the development of CSR commitments and (2) to assess the impact of 
CSR commitments and communications on those stakeholders, by using an integrative 
framework aimed at providing an integrated stakeholder orientation for a step by step 
implementation of CSR (Maignan et al., 2005).  
 
Our analyses are based on an in-depth case study of IKEA and its main stakeholders: 
trade unions, customers, partner NGOs, organizations having blamed IKEA on CSR matters, 
local public authorities, organizations protecting small businesses, and specialized organizations 
dedicated to consultancy, promotion, and monitoring of CSR practices. Because of its continuous 
pressure on price and sub-contractors from developing countries, IKEA stands in a good position 
to run up against the sensitivity of alter globalization protesters. But in the same time, IKEA is 
seldom blamed on its CSR practices. 
 
Our results show how stakeholders can influence the development of CSR policies by 
conveying their societal expectations, by publicly blaming corporate behaviours considered as 
irresponsible or by entering in a collaborative and constructive relationship with the company. 
This case study also highlights the complexity of the corporate decisions related to CSR practices 
and communication, as well as the central role played by scepticism in the construction of CSR-
based attitudes towards the company. By not involving stakeholders enough, IKEA’s CSR policy 
is gauged as too unilateral, what leads to a certain stakeholders’ scepticism about IKEA’s CSR 
practices. And IKEA is criticized for adopting a low profile in terms of CSR communication.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Numerous authors have underlined that it is really complex to analyse the effects of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies on the perceptions and attitudes of that 
company’s stakeholders (Mohr, Webb, and Harris, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001). 
Moreover when speaking about stakeholders, academic and practitioners’ investigations mainly 
consider consumers (e.g. Barone, Miyazaki, and Taylor, 2000; Brown and Dacin, 1997), 
investors (e.g. Sparkes, 2002; Webley, Lewis, and Mackenzie, 2001), and employees as well as 
job applicants (Davis, 1973; Turban and Greening, 1997; Williams and Bauer, 1994). In spite of 
the rising influence of NGOs in shaping the social responsibility and ethical orientations of 
business (Guay, Doh, and Sinclair, 2004; Ottaway, 2001), the impact of CSR implementation 
and communication on NGOs’ perceptions and attitudes is rarely evoked. A similar statement 
can be made about other main stakeholders such as public administration or trade unions. 
Finally, empirical studies generally take into account one category of stakeholder at a time, 
preventing analysts from examining the likely differential impacts of CSR on distinct categories 
of stakeholders.  
 
In this paper, we propose to rise above those weaknesses by (1) analyzing how different 
external and ubiquitous stakeholders can influence the development of CSR commitments, and 
by (2) assessing the impact of CSR commitments and CSR communications on those 
stakeholders. For those purposes, we will use the integrative framework of Maignan et al. (2005) 
aimed at providing an integrated stakeholder orientation for a step by step implementation of 
CSR. This framework highlights the movement from a narrow customer orientation to a 
responsible dimension of marketing that emphasizes the need to create and manage meaningful 
and beneficial relationships with all relevant stakeholders of the company (American Marketing 
Association, 2004).  
Our analyses are based on an in-depth case study of the company IKEA and its main 
stakeholders: trade unions, customers, partner NGOs, organizations having blamed IKEA on 
CSR matters, local public authorities, organizations protecting small businesses, and specialized 
organizations dedicated to consultancy, promotion, and monitoring of CSR practices. This case 
study has been carried out in Belgium during 2005. 
 
IKEA is a global home furniture hypermarket whose business model lies on continuous 
pressure on price and sub-contractors from developing countries, and a development essentially 
based on the increase of its wood procurements. Therefore, IKEA stands in a good position to 
run up against the sensitivity of alter globalization protesters. But in the same time, IKEA is 
seldom blamed on its CSR practices, although its CSR historic path in the last twenty-five years 
discloses manifold false steps and alarms. No charge paste for long on the Swedish-born 
transnational company (Miller, 2001). 
 
This paper starts with a brief conceptual background about CSR, stakeholder theory and the 
comprehensive framework offered by Maignan et al. (2005). Literature about stakeholders’ 
reactions to CSR activities will also be briefly summarised. Then, the methodology part lists our 
research questions and presents the different techniques that have been used for data collection. 
Main findings are finally listed, followed by the most important implications and lessons drawn 
from this case study. 
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CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility: a multifaceted construct 
Discussions about CSR have been taking place since the 1950’s and more precisely since 
Bowen (1953, p.6) argued that businessmen have the duty “to pursue those policies, to make 
those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives 
and values of our society”. Nowadays the ground of CSR has been widely developed and 
includes a significant abundance of approaches and terminologies sometimes hazy, divisive and 
often complex (de Bakker, Groenewegen, and Den Hond, 2005; Garriga and Melé, 2004). Table 
1 gives a brief overview of the diversity of CSR conceptualisations.  
 
Table 1: Different conceptualisations of CSR.  
“Corporate social responsibility is the managerial obligation to take action to protect and to improve both 
the welfare of society as a whole and the interest of organizations”  
(Davis and Blomstrom 1975). 
“Corporate Social Responsibility relates primarily to achieving outcomes from organizational decisions 
concerning  specific issues or problems which (by some normative standards) have beneficial rather than 
adverse effects on pertinent corporate stakeholders”  
(Epstein, 1987) 
“Corporate social responsibility is a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”  
(European Union, www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/soc-dial/csr/csr_index.htm). 
“It is suggested that four kinds of social responsibilities constitute total CSR: economic, legal, ethical and 
philanthropic” (Carroll, 1991) 
“Corporate social responsibility is operating a business in a manner that consistently meets or exceeds the 
ethical, legal, commercial, and public expectations that society has of business” (CSR Europe, 
www.csreurope.org). 
“CSR is the business' commitment to contribute to sustainable economic development, working with 
employees, their families, the local community, and society at large to improve their quality of life”  
(World Business Council for Sustainable Development, www.wbcsd.org). 
 
More recent conceptualizations have been proposed under the ideas of corporate citizenship 
(Laufer, 1996) and corporate sustainability (Elkington, 1998; Zadek, 1999). The common 
consideration encompassing these concepts is that companies can’t no longer merely be 
concerned with increasing profits. Companies have - next to their economic and legal obligations 
- certain ethical and discretionary responsibilities to society (Carroll, 1979; Donaldson and 
Dunfee, 1994). In that context, several organizations – already conscious of their role and 
responsibilities or reconsidering them – engage in building and supporting social, environmental, 
and health programs (Tixier, 2005).  
 
 
Stakeholder theory: an integrative framework for CSR 
Companies do not evolve in a universe gravitating only around shareholders, but operate 
within greater networks with financial, political, and social members, all of whom putting 
companies under various pressures (Martin, 2002). Those people are the stakeholders or “any 
group or individual that can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation’s purpose” 
(Freeman, 1984, p.46).  
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Stakeholders are making the links between society’s expectations and companies (Whetten, 
Rands and Godfrey 2002). They thus play a key role in the forward movement of companies in 
CSR issues recognition by translating and conveying societal expectations and pressures to the 
organization. Consequently, companies have to address the CSR issues that interest those 
societal actors (Lamberg et al., 2003) and to develop appropriate strategies for managing and/or 
changing their stakeholders’ expectations. 
 
Maignan et al. (2005) propose a comprehensive framework for managing CSR integration 
through 8 main steps to be followed in a cyclical perspective (see figure 1): 
(1) Discovering organizational values and norms. 
(2) Identifying stakeholders and their respective salience. 
(3) Identifying the main issues of concern to the identified key stakeholders. 
(4) Assessing a meaning of CSR that fits the organization of interest. 
(5) Auditing current practices. 
(6) Prioritizing and Implementing CSR changes and initiatives. 
(7) Promoting CSR by creating awareness and getting stakeholders involved.   
(8) Gaining stakeholders feedback. 
 
Figure 1: A step by step approach for implementing CSR (Maignan et al., 2005, p. 966) 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholders’ reactions to CSR activities: a complex and contextual process  
The impact of CSR on stakeholders has been examined even though it can be considered as 
an under-researched area. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) showed that the reputation of a company 
will be enhanced when it is perceived as contributing to the common social good. In the same 
vein, Sen (1993) as well as Murray and Vogel (1997) report that ethical corporate behaviour and 
CSR play an essential role in developing corporate goodwill on key stakeholders. Furthermore, 
STEP 1 : 
Discovering 
organizational 
norms and values 
STEP 2 : 
Identifying 
stakeholders 
STEP 3 : 
Identifying 
stakeholder issues 
STEP 4 : 
Assessing the 
meaning of CSR 
STEP 5 : 
Auditing current 
practices 
STEP 6 : 
Implementing 
CSR initiatives 
STEP 7 : 
Promoting 
CSR 
STEP 8 : 
Gaining 
stakeholder 
feedback 
Short-term feedback loop 
Long-term feedback loop 
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marketing policies are encouraged to focus on the ethical aspect of the product, because 
information related to the ethical behaviour of the company is expected to influence positively 
the corporate image of the company (Mascarenhas, 1995) as well as the attitudes of consumers 
with respect to the company and its products (Brown and Dacin, 1997; Creyer and Ross, 1997). 
 
Even though individuals seem to adopt a more favourable attitude towards companies that 
behave “ethically”, this statement becomes more complex when deeper analyzed (Folkes and 
Kamins, 1999). Sen and Bhattacharya (2001) have illustrated this complexity by showing that 
CSR initiatives can, under certain conditions (depending on product quality and on consumer 
support for the issue at stake), decrease consumers’ intentions to buy the new product of the 
socially responsible company. 
Furthermore companies can expect that stakeholders will punish the socially and 
environmentally irresponsible corporate behaviours, but not necessarily “reward” the responsible 
ones. The ethical weakness negatively influences the attitude of individuals in a greater extent 
than the ethical “chastity” positively influences this one (Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Skowronski 
and Carlston, 1987). 
 
Finally, a lot of companies hesitate to communicate about their CSR practices (Vanhamme, 
and Swaen, 2003) since companies that are doing the most in the area of CSR are also the ones that 
are criticized the most whereas the ones that are not doing anything are the least criticized (SEE 
Newsletter, 2001). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The development of our case study has been articulated around two main research questions:  
(1) How did the different stakeholders influence IKEA’s CSR policies and CSR 
communication? 
(2) What are the effects of IKEA’s CSR commitments and communication on different 
stakeholders’ perceptions and attitudes? 
 
Because of the importance of the context, we used the case study research method (Hamel 
and Dufour, 1993; Yin, 1984) and diverse complementary data collection techniques. Firstly, an 
exhaustive inventory of IKEA’s communication about its CSR activities has been built through 
media analysis and stores visits in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Secondly, an extensive 
desk research has been carried out followed by in-depth interviews of 2 IKEA executives and 20 
external stakeholders (see table 2) between April and June 2005. A qualitative content analysis 
has been developed with the support of textual data analysis software (ATLAS-Ti). Finally, a 
survey has been carried out on a sample of 150 IKEA’s customers to measure their knowledge, 
perceptions and attitudes towards IKEA’s CSR policies and communication. This survey was 
based on a self-administrated questionnaire specifically built-up for the purpose of this study. 
Customers have been selected according to quotas in terms of gender, age and socio-professional 
categories in order to ensure sample representativeness of IKEA’s customers (figures from 
IKEA, 2004a). Collected data have been analyzed through statistical analysis software (SPSS).  
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Table 2: List of interviewed stakeholders. 
7 international and national partner NGOs and associations in environmental and human rights matters 
2 unions representatives 
3 local public authorities representatives 
2 environmental NGOs  
1 Dutch multinational-specialised research foundation having blamed IKEA on CSR matters 
1 representative of an organization protecting small businesses 
4 representatives of specialized organizations dedicated to consultancy, promotion and monitoring of CSR 
practices 
 
MAIN FINDINGS 
 
IKEA’s brief general description. 
The IKEA group has 90,000 co-workers, operates in 44 countries and territories and its range 
of products is made of more than 9500 references. Its business model lies on low prices to make 
well-designed and functional home furnishings available to everyone. Most of IKEA’s supply 
purchasing is external: IKEA has 46 trading service offices in 32 countries. IKEA also owns 
several of its supplier factories through its industrial group, Swedwood, that is actually present in 
9 countries and that is producing 30% of IKEA’s product range. 
 
IKEA and its CSR commitments. 
The displayed ambition of IKEA in CSR matters is to integrate social and environmental 
considerations as natural elements of the daily management operations of the group: the 
objective of IKEA is “to make products which have minimum impact on the environment and to 
manufacture them in a socially responsible way” (IKEA, 2004b). IKEA’s business vision – 
“create a better everyday life for the many people” (IKEA, 2005a) – is considered as fostering 
the development of CSR policies (Slavin, 2001) in five fields: the product development, the 
supply policy, the transport, the storage, and the shops (IKEA, 2004c). IKEA’s CSR 
commitments have been materialized in 1998 by the creation of a voluntary code of conduct: The 
IKEA Way. 
According to Christopherson and Lillie (2005), IKEA’s corporate ideology with respect to 
CSR is derived from prevailing norms and institutional relationships that are common to Nordic 
countries putting ethical values, politics and economics as constitutive elements of a virtuous 
circle. Through this virtuous circle, IKEA considers that the conflict between CSR and profits 
can be unravelled.  
In the way to the integration of CSR in its strategy, IKEA has met several pitfalls, 
particularly at the end of the eighties and during the last decade of the 20th century. Figure 2 
summarises (1) the main CSR-related criticisms and scandals faced by IKEA from the eighties 
up to 2004, (2) most of the IKEA’s reactions to those criticisms, as well as (3) most of its 
proactive CSR activities.  
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Figure 2. Stakeholder’s influences and IKEA’s CSR policies. 
…Late 80’s… 1990 1992… …1994 1995… …1997 19991998 200081981…
1981: Target of an 
aggressive public campaign 
in Denmark concerning the 
presence of high levels of 
formaldehyde in 
particleboards. Sued and 
condemned for having 
violated Danish law. 
Temporarily loss of sales of 
20% on Danish market
1990-91: First internal 
report of a workgroup on 
environmental impact of 
IKEA’s activities: IKEA is 
described as an 
“environmental” gangster. 
IKEA adopts officially the 
first environmental policy
of the group in 1991. 
1992(a): IKEA faces a new unexpected crisis 
linked to formaldehyde. This time in Germany 
and concerning its world-famous Billy
Bookshelf. Media cover is worldwide and 
impact is important. Costs are estimated at $ 
6.5 millions on products recall only. It costs 
IKEA and its suppliers more than $ 10 millions.
1992: IKEA deepens the 
joint efforts with The 
Natural Step initiated in 
1990. The environmental 
policy is transformed in a 
plan of action with 
concrete practices. The 
developed structures 
seem efficient.
1994: Swedish 
documentary 
blames IKEA on 
child labour in 
Pakistani factories 
and shows on 
television children 
chained on 
machines-woven.
1991
Late 80’s: Intensification of critics on 
environmentally-related issues like 
packaging wastes and the use of 
PVC plastics that would contain 
dioxins (Germany). The amount of 
waste generated by the production of 
catalogues, the use of chlorine 
bleached paper for its production, as 
well as the numbers of trees felled 
each year to produce it come under 
scrutiny. 
1991: IKEA managed 
with the help of 
Greenpeace to print 
the millions IKEA 
catalogues on 
Chlorine Free 
paper. IKEA works 
also with 
Greenpeace on PVC 
issue. 
Setting up of a large 
testing laboratory for its 
products. Introduction of 
new requirements for  
suppliers. Discussions 
with BASF and ICI in 
Germany to find ways to 
reduce formaldehyde off-
gassing in IKEA products
1994: New business manager of the 
group Marianne Barner stops 
contracts with the implicated 
Pakistani supplier and adds a 
standard clause forbidding child 
labour in suppliers contracts. She 
travels to Pakistan, India and Nepal 
to check de visu the work conditions, 
to meet collaborators in buying 
offices, suppliers and NGOs 
representatives. A cooperation with 
Save the Children is launched to 
find solutions to the child labour 
issue IKEA faces.
1995: A German 
documentary 
pretends children of 
5 and 6 tissue IKEA-
carpets near Delhi in 
India since 1990. The 
story hits the 
international press 
before the claims are 
refuted as 
fabrications. The 
impact in terms of 
public relations is 
severe. Different 
stakeholders groups 
(press, unions, 
consumers and 
Human Rights 
activists) initiate 
investigations on 
IKEA’s practices, and 
call sometimes to 
boycott and 
demonstration.
1995: Barner 
immediately  fires the 
Indian company. 
Ikea's reputation 
suffers a serious 
setback. 
Management is under 
pressure and 
demands opinions of 
experts and 
assistance unions 
and to international 
organizations such 
as ILO and UNICEF.
1997(a): IKEA faces 
new allegations 
concerning two 
Indian textile 
suppliers that would 
have recourse to 
child labour. 
Evidences of abuses 
are not officially 
demonstrated
1997(a) : 
Monitoring of 
the minimum 
working age is 
tightened by 
IKEA.  
1997(b): Another 
documentary reports 
that children 
working in factories
in Vietnam and 
Philippines and 
supplying IKEA are 
under the minimum 
age.
1998: The 
Nordic 
Woodworkers 
Federation, 
that has 
straight links 
with IFBWW 
threatens to 
organize a 
boycott of 
IKEA after a 
Sunday 
Times article 
highlights 
lamentable 
work 
conditions in 
sawmills and 
factories of 
IKEA 
suppliers.  
1998: Unions require 
to meet IKEA 
executives. At first 
really sceptical, IKEA 
agrees to adopt  ILO 
standards for 
working conditions. 
An agreement with 
the IFBWW is signed. 
This document 
covers all 
subsidiaries of the 
IKEA group and 
constitutes its first 
code of conduct.
1998-1999: At 
the end of the 
90’s, pressures 
from 
environmental 
groups intensify, 
especially 
concerning 
wood 
procurements 
issues, in 
Russia and 
Indonesia. A 
lack of clarity 
and 
transparency is 
underlined by 
among others 
Robin Wood in 
Germany - that 
intent 
spectacular 
actions - and 
Greenpeace.
1998-99: After having 
launched in 1998 with a 
Malaysian foundation the 
Sow a Seed project
aiming at replanting 
millions trees on Borneo. 
IKEA works with 
Greenpeace and officially 
engages in 1999 in 
phasing out all purchases 
of products made from 
unknown sources of wood 
to ensure that no wood 
originates from ancient 
forests. Only exception will 
be for wood from ancient 
forests coming from FSC
certified forestry.
1998-99 (b):  IKEA 
initiates in 1998 a 
partnership with 
UNICEF to prevent 
child labour and 
accompanies families 
in their fight against 
poverty in India.
2000: IKEA injects 
$500 000 in UNICEF 
projects in programs 
aiming at helping 
childhood in India, 
and vaccination 
projects in 
collaboration with 
WHO.
2000: IKEA 
engages with 
Global Forest 
Watch (World 
Resource Institute) 
in the mapping of 
ancient forests and 
dynamites the 
project by funding 
it. $2.5 millions are 
freed to support 
the project. 
20018 20028 20038 20048
2003: Dutch 
Foundation SOMO 
publishes a study on 
labour conditions in 
IKEA’s supply 
chain, asked by the 
Dutch union FNV.  
The report details 
several violations of 
the displayed code of 
conduct in the 
different visited 
factories, essentially 
at the social level, but 
also at an 
environmental one. 
(Mainly; wages 
levels, freedom of 
association, work 
hours, etc.). Impact of 
the study is curiously 
low.
1999: IKEA 
stands in the 
centre of a 
French polemic 
situation after 
that an e-mail 
sent by the 
French 
marketing 
director 
mentioned it is 
preferable not to 
recruit coloured 
staff for some 
functions related 
to direct clients 
contact.
2001: IKEA 
adopts its own 
« IWAY » 
voluntary code 
of conduct in 
social and 
environmental 
matters. 
2002: WWF and 
IKEA join their 
force in a formal 
partnership in the 
perspective of 
cooperating for 
responsible 
forestry at a 
worldwide level. 
Forests 
certification and 
education to a 
forestry 
management stay 
at the heart of the 
displayed 
commitments.
2003: IKEA launches 
a two years global 
cause-related 
marketing operation 
with UNICEF to 
finance projects for 
children  in Uganda 
and Angola.
2000-2004: In 2003-
2004, IKEA launches 
several punctual cause-
related marketing 
operations with Save 
the Children (STC) in 
different countries. 
IKEA funds. Since 
2000, IKEA funds STC  
projects in Kosovo (500 
000$ in 2004) IKEA 
also contributed to 
studies in Vietnam and 
Bangladesh and 
supports STC literacy 
programs in the US.
2004: 
IKEA joins 
in the UN’s 
Global 
Compact
Main 
criticisms 
and 
scandals 
faced by 
IKEA from 
1981 to 
2004
Reactions to 
critical 
situations and 
main steps in 
CSR policies 
development 
from 1981 to 
2004
1997-98 (b): The contract with the 
Philippians supplier is suspended 
when he refuses to cooperate and 
improve work conditions in its 
factory. Cooperation with 
UNICEF is deepened.
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Scandals and criticisms faced by IKEA.  
IKEA has been involved in different scandals related to child labour in Asia, hazardous 
products used in furniture production in Western Europe, criticisable working conditions in 
Eastern Europe and Asia, and obscure wood sources from Russia to Indonesia.  
 
In the environmental domain – including products and wood procurement issues – the 
external stakeholders at the origin of the multiple criticisms were mainly NGO’s such as 
Greenpeace (Owens, 1998) and Robin Wood (Robin Wood, 1999), as well as some public 
authorities for what concerns hazardous product components like in the formaldehyde and 
dioxin-related crisis in Denmark (1981) and in Germany (1992) (The Natural Step, 1999). 
 
In the field of working conditions, union federations - such as the Nordic Woodworkers 
Federation and the the International Federation of Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW) - 
played a significant role in conveying sombre issues to IKEA (Artto, 1998). But the leading role 
was however played by the media. Between 1992 and 1994, journalists’ investigations revealed 
in – sometimes wrongfully – different Asian child labour and working conditions scandals 
(Christopherson and Lillie, 2005; Miller, 2001). Consequently to those revelations, unions, 
consumer associations and human rights protection organizations started to look deeper into 
IKEA’s practices and called for boycotting IKEA’s products (Maignan and McAlister, 2003).  
 
Reactive and proactive CSR actions of IKEA.  
IKEA put into place different programs of actions aiming at dodging risks, latent detractors’ 
criticisms and their potential harmful impacts. IKEA also tried to anticipate environmental 
demands as a part of its corporate culture and management philosophy. IKEA aligned in that 
perspective with stakeholders’ expectations or at least indicated its willingness to engage the 
company in the right direction.  
 
The analysis of the development process of CSR at IKEA highlights two main elements:  
 
1. The Importance of external stakeholders in the development and enforcement of socially 
responsible buying practices agreements and codes of conduct 
In 1998, IKEA developed a code of conduct that covers three main domains: external 
environment (pollution, toxics, hazardous waste...), social working conditions, and forestry 
management. This code is based on a 1996 IFBWW-IKEA agreement and on discussions with 
NGOs like Greenpeace, WWF and Save the Children, what emphasizes the important role played 
by stakeholders such as unions and NGOs in establishing socially responsible buying practices.  
 
The monitoring and auditing of implementation of this code by suppliers is carried out by 
local buying offices, while IKEA’s internal “Compliance and Monitoring group” follows up 
developments on a global basis. This work is verified by independent auditing firms which report 
directly to the head of the group. However, only the IFBWW receives the results of the audits 
through semi-annual meetings. In that context of lack of transparency, NGOs have a central role 
to play to enforce the regulations, agreements, and codes of conduct related to CSR issues. In the 
case of IKEA, it is emphasized through the maintenance and influence of continuous pressures 
(from Greenpeace, Robin Wood, SOMO for instance) aiming at recalling the different duties and 
responsibilities related to IKEA’s strategic options and daily activities.  
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IKEA has – as a result - further been brought to build up cooperative projects in 
environmental and social matters with various types of NGOs, characterized by a varying level 
of formalization and duration. Today, the most important environmental partnerships built by 
IKEA are linked to forestry, since wood and wood fibres represent 70% of IKEA’s raw 
materials. IKEA develops collaborations with the WWF, Greenpeace, Global Forest Watch and a 
Swedish University. It also demonstrates external certification efforts, and engaged in planting 
operations through a co-founded Malaysian organization. In social matters, IKEA mainly 
developed partnerships related to children’s rights (Luce, 2004), notably with UNICEF and Save 
the Children. IKEA has also created a position of mediator of the children centralizing the issue 
within the group.  
 
2. The proactive behavior of IKEA in the development of CSR commitments 
IKEA does not simply consider CSR policies as reactions to criticisms and scandals but as 
making integrative part of its business model. This model indeed involves – among others - 
principles linked to energy use, resources consumption, waste management and it underlines a 
particular “egalitarian” corporate culture and an altruist corporate vision. IKEA presents itself as 
a CSR-concerned company, characterized by a certain speed of reaction, a humble attitude, and 
an increasingly proactive behaviour. 
 
IKEA’s CSR communication.  
IKEA considers that little publicity is good publicity (Lewis, 2005). Nevertheless IKEA 
doesn’t want to appear as a distributor achieving low price at any price. In order to communicate 
IKEA’s CSR commitments to the different stakeholders, IKEA uses – even slightly - traditional 
communication tools such as below the line communication, catalogues, and in-store 
information, as well as CSR-specific communication tools like codes of conduct, cause-related 
marketing operations with UNICEF or Save the Children, and sustainable development reports.  
 
It is unambiguous that IKEA tries to keep a low profile and prefers to progress cautiously by 
privileging actions instead of communication in CSR matters. In that perspective, IKEA exhibits 
a passive behaviour in terms of CSR communication. Although IKEA developed several CSR 
communication tools, the group rarely put ethical concerns in messages directly transmitted to 
customers and other stakeholders and stays relatively vague about the results already obtained. 
IKEA rather lets potentially interested parties “find” CSR information about IKEA by 
themselves. 
 
Customers’ reactions to IKEA’s CSR commitments and communication. 
IKEA’s customers have the feeling of not being informed on IKEA’s CSR policies, but they 
don’t significantly ask for more CSR information. 
 
On average, surveyed IKEA’s customers have a slightly positive perception about IKEA’s 
CSR commitments (mean = 4,3 on a scale from 1 to 7). Only 5,4 % of them have a strong 
unfavourable perception about IKEA’s CSR activities. However these relatively positive 
customers’ attitudes with respect to IKEA’s CSR don’t significantly influence their intentions to 
buy IKEA’s products. The relatively ethical “chastity” of IKEA doesn’t constitute a determinant 
factor in IKEA’s consumer behaviour, while 40,6 % of customers affirm they would boycott 
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IKEA if they learn about important negligence related to CSR matters they attach importance to. 
As shown by Carrigan and Attala (2001), this illustrates that ethical weaknesses negatively 
influence the attitude of consumers in a greater extent than the ethical “goodness” positively 
influences this one. However it is appropriate to keep in mind that ethical consumption is often a 
position of principles more often claimed than really translate into acts (Bigot, 2002). 
 
Other stakeholders’ reactions to IKEA’s CSR commitments and communication.  
The general stakeholders’ perceptions about IKEA’s CSR policies are relatively favourable. 
However some interesting differences have been highlighted according to the type of stakeholder 
considered.  
 
Partner NGOs and organizations collaborating with IKEA have a positive vision of IKEA’s 
commitments and consider IKEA’s efforts as “generally constructive and relevant”. IKEA is 
perceived as a proactive company because of its progressive objectives including CSR. This 
image is notably based on private information those organizations have about IKEA due to their 
formalised partnerships with IKEA. Resulting attitude is supportive but stays critical at the same 
time. Even though IKEA is considered as an exemplary company, partner NGOs regularly 
mentioned that IKEA is only “on the way” of CSR. 
 
Non-partner organizations having in the past publicly called out IKEA on its CSR 
commitments consider that a lot of work still needs to be accomplished. They criticized the CSR 
guidelines of IKEA as being unclear and too general. For some of them, IKEA is even “on a 
dangerous line” and perceived as more reactive than proactive. Resulting attitude towards IKEA 
can be qualified as unanimously sceptical. This really contrasts with the perceptions of partner 
NGOs.  
 
Local public administration generally has a positive perception of IKEA because of the 
positive socio-economic impact of the presence of IKEA in the city. Resulting attitude towards 
IKEA and its CSR policies is essentially supportive. 
 
For trade unions representatives, IKEA’s CSR policies are effective and actual but stay 
hidden and out of sight. Communication to internal stakeholders is deemed as superficial. The 
willingness “to see IKEA progressing further” in the direction of its initial CSR commitments is 
clearly expressed. Their resulting attitude is encouraging albeit critical. 
 
In general, specialised organisms in promotion, consultancy and monitoring of CSR have a 
relatively positive image of IKEA’s CSR policies. But some of them estimate that IKEA “put 
emphasis only on some specific CSR issues”. Resulting attitudes towards IKEA are essentially 
respectful even if a lack of visibility and communication of CSR actions and decision choices is 
mentioned. 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of our main findings with respect to stakeholders’ perceptions 
about CSR commitments and communication. 
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Table 3. Stakeholders’ perceptions and reactions to IKEA’s CSR commitments and 
communication  
(scale going from 0 to 3 stars, “0” representing the worst analyzed evaluation, “***” representing the best evaluation 
on an absolute basis). 
 
Type of 
stakeholders 
Perception about 
IKEA’s CSR 
commitments 
Perception about 
IKEA’s CSR 
communication 
Induced attitude 
towards IKEA 
NGOs that have 
formalized 
partnerships or 
collaboration with 
IKEA 
- Positive perception 
- IKEA considered as a 
proactive company 
BUT 
- Too slow 
implementation  
 
 
*** 
- Positive opinion 
- High perceived 
credibility 
BUT  
- Too sporadic 
communication with the 
general public 
 
** 
- Supportive attitude 
- IKEA considered as an 
exemplary company 
BUT 
- Still critical attitude 
 
 
 
*** 
Other NGOs that 
have only 
punctual 
partnerships with 
IKEA 
 
- Relatively positive 
perception 
BUT  
- Too slow 
implementation  
- Not enough involvement 
of stakeholders in the 
process 
 
** 
- Lack of transparency 
BUT  
- Too sporadic 
communication with the 
general public 
 
 
 
 
* 
- Supportive attitude  
BUT 
- Still critical attitude 
- Sometimes sceptical 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
Organizations 
having publicly 
blamed IKEA on 
CSR issues 
- Sincerity of the 
commitments under 
question 
BUT  
- Too slow 
implementation  
- Dangerous strategic line 
- IKEA considered as a 
reactive company 
 
* 
--- 
BUT  
- Lack of transparency 
- Lack of independent 
monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
O 
--- 
BUT 
- Demanding attitude 
- Sceptical attitude 
- Protesting, expressing 
opposition to IKEA  
 
 
 
 
* 
Public authorities 
from Belgium 
- Positive perception 
- IKEA considered as a 
proactive company 
 
 
*** 
- Positive opinion 
- Perceived transparency 
- High perceived 
credibility 
 
** 
- Supportive attitude  
BUT  
- Still demanding 
 
 
*** 
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Table 3 (continued). 
Unions from 
Belgium 
- Relatively positive 
perception 
BUT  
- Too slow 
implementation 
- Not enough involvement 
of stakeholders in the 
process 
 
** 
- High perceived 
credibility  
BUT 
- Lack of transparency 
- Too sporadic 
communication with the 
general public 
 
 
* 
- Supportive attitude BUT 
- Still critical attitude 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
Specialised 
organisms in 
promotion, 
consultancy and 
monitoring with 
respect to CSR 
- Relatively positive 
perception 
BUT 
- Feeling that there is quite 
better to do in the field 
 
 
 
 
** 
--- 
BUT 
- Lack of transparency 
- Too sporadic 
communication with the 
general public 
- Reduced range of 
strategic topics 
 
* 
- Respectful and 
supportive attitude 
BUT 
- Still sceptical attitude 
 
 
 
 
 
** 
 
 Partner organizations, trade unions and public administrations which have regular contacts 
with IKEA about social and environmental topics usually have a better perception of IKEA’s 
CSR commitments and policies than organizations that have only accessed to independent and 
external sources of information on IKEA’s CSR policies. Transparency – that is demanded by an 
extensively large majority of stakeholders – plays a positive role in the development of 
stakeholders’ positive attitudes towards the firm.  
 
IKEA: a step by step approach for implementing corporate responsibility? 
The integrative framework proposed by Maignan et al. (2005) uses existing knowledge about 
stakeholder theory to support the implementation of a well-integrated CSR program in a step by 
step approach. The three first steps of the model are “aiming at generating information about 
CSR among a variety of influencers in and around the organization” (Maignan et al., 2005, 
p.970) and must allow to assess the meaning of CSR for the organization (step 4). The fifth step 
consists in assessing and reporting business performance of current practices, what permits to 
progress in implementation of CSR initiatives related to the most valued CSR issues (step 6). 
Step 7 deals with promoting CSR while the last step concerns stakeholders’ feedbacks, which 
can influence the previous steps of the model. We will follow this model to analyse the 
development of CSR policies at IKEA. 
 
Step 1: Discovering organizational values and norms 
IKEA’s origin, values and culture – translated into mission statement, business vision, and 
communication strategy – constitute a strong basis for implementing a CSR program well-
integrated into IKEA’s business model. Organizational values and norms – emphasizing 
egalitarian values and the willingness to create “a better everyday life for the many people” 
(IKEA, 2005a) – initially fit with the prerequisite of openness towards stakeholders issues. 
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Step 2/3: Identifying stakeholders and identifying stakeholders’ issues 
IKEA’s business idea is principally based on a partnership with customers1, what gives a 
leading role to customers. With respect to them, the main issue is “to offer a wide range of home 
furnishings with good design and function at prices so low that as many people as possible will 
be able to afford them2”. 
 
Secondly, employees are considered as the “IKEA family” and the suppliers are considered 
as the central actors of the supply chain. Main CSR issues are related to the working conditions 
at IKEA (f.i., giving people the opportunity to grow as individuals and in their professional 
career) as well as in the complex and extensive supply chain (f.i. child labour issue). 
 
However, due to the different crises faced by IKEA over time, IKEA has discovered the 
importance of taking into account other key stakeholders such as environmental NGOs (f.i., 
Greenpeace, Robin Wood), the media and union federations (f.i., the Nordic Woodworkers 
Federation), that lead IKEA to deal with other emerging issues such as workers’ safety and well-
being in the sub-suppliers network, wood certifications issues, or CO2 emissions. Over time, 
IKEA has created partnerships with an enlarged list of NGOs – such as Save the Children, 
Unicef, or the WWF – and union federations – such as IFBWW. 
 
Step 4: Assessing the meaning of CSR 
IKEA’s vision highlights two essential points: the motivation supporting the CSR 
commitment and the stakeholders’ issues that are perceived as priorities: 
  
“Customers (…) must be able to find good home furnishing products at IKEA at prices so 
low they can afford to enjoy a better everyday life at home. (…) That’s the IKEA vision: “To 
create a better everyday life for the many people”. (…) But IKEA’s responsibilities don’t 
stop there. We also want the products we sell to be free from hazardous substances. And we 
don’t want the wood in bookcases, tables or other products in the store to come from areas 
where forests are being devastated. All IKEA suppliers, wherever they are in the world, must 
follow certain fundamental rules. Child labour is not tolerated, working conditions must be 
acceptable and suppliers must adopt a responsible attitude to the environment. The aim is to 
make products which have minimum impact on the environment and to manufacture them in 
a socially responsible way.” (IKEA, 2004b, p.2). 
 
Step 5: Auditing current practices 
IKEA carries out regular market studies on customers, suppliers and employees (IKEA, 
2005b). It has also developed a batch of key performance indicators in order to assess the 
achievement of its social objectives and the most important CSR issues. IKEA has its internal 
audit structure since 2000 and asks auditing from external auditors such as 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG or ITS.  
 
                                                 
1 See IKEA (2006) : e.g. http://www.ikea-group.ikea.com/corporate/privacy_policy.html (accessed on april 12th 2006). 
2 See IKEA (2006): e.g. www.ikea.com/ms/en_GB/about_ikea/ our_vision/better_life.html (accessed on april 12th 2006). 
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Step 6: Implementing CSR initiatives 
Social audits allow IKEA to progress in its implementation of CSR initiatives related to the 
most valued CSR issues. Some of the IKEA’s CSR initiatives have only required limited 
adaptations of the existing process. It is the case for cause-related marketing actions with 
UNICEF or Save the Children as well as for philanthropic donations to Global Forest Watch or 
planting projects. Those operations were consolidated around two big priorities: the child 
wellbeing and the protection of the globe’s forests. But next to those minor adaptations, 
completely new processes have been created consecutively to the development of the IKEA’s 
code of conduct (The IKEA Way3). For instance, specific CSR functions have been created in 
order to ensure the coherence of the CSR initiatives and programs at both local and international 
levels. 
 
Step 7: Promoting CSR 
According to our interviews, four main elements can be stressed about stakeholders’ 
assessment of IKEA’s CSR promotion: 
- IKEA’s CSR communications are perceived as highly credible, even though they are 
criticized for being too general and voluntarily blurred and imprecise, 
- IKEA’s CSR communications are generally considered as not transparent enough, 
- IKEA’s CSR communications are perceived as too shy and a majority of stakeholders asks 
for more communication on the CSR actions effectively implemented by IKEA, 
- IKEA doesn’t develop a structured dialogue with stakeholders and works with them on a 
case by case basis. 
 
IKEA cautiously creates awareness around its CSR efforts and adopts a low profile in the 
CSR communicational aspects. Most of the interviewed stakeholders mentioned the lack of 
communication and the lack of dialogue with IKEA about CSR initiatives. This is particularly 
the case for NGOs (except UNICEF and the WWF) and unions (except IFBWW). Even though 
IKEA officially displays great concern about external suggestions for improvement, little is 
made to encourage ideas exchange and interactions with stakeholders. Some stakeholders (e.g. 
SOMO, and to a certain extent Greenpeace) consider it is a deliberate failure in communicating 
transparently the actual advancement of the stated policies. By not involving stakeholders, 
IKEA’s CSR policy is gauged as too unilateral, what leads to a certain stakeholders’ scepticism 
about IKEA’s CSR practices.  
 
Step 8: Gaining stakeholders’ feedback 
IKEA doesn’t show a real structured dialogue with its key external and ubiquitous 
stakeholders.  
Audit results remain confidential for most stakeholders (except IFBWW and the WWF). A 
majority of them are not involved in the implementation and monitoring process of IKEA’s CSR 
policies and practices. They are not invited to take part to the choice of CSR actions and 
implementation modes. This lack of dialogue and transparency reduces the potential efficiency 
of stakeholders’ feedback on the improvement of CSR policies.  
 
 
                                                 
3 This code defines what suppliers can expect from IKEA and what IKEA requires from its suppliers in terms of 
legal requirements, working conditions, child labour, and environment and forestry management. 
 16
In conclusion, IKEA seems to develop an efficient CSR program. However, the promotion 
and stakeholders’ feedback raise several troubles, what could negatively influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions and evaluations of the implementation of CSR initiatives because of the feedback 
loops included in the model (see figure 1). As long as IKEA’s dialogue with some of its key 
stakeholders won’t be more transparent and structured, the feedback given by stakeholders will 
not be really helpful in terms of CSR improvement and the auditing of the current practices 
won’t be given all the credibility it needs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The impact of CSR communication stays an under-researched field often too narrowly 
oriented to very specific types of stakeholders, neglecting other major key stakeholders. In that 
context, this case study firstly illustrates how external and ubiquitous stakeholders can influence 
the development of CSR policies by conveying to the company their societal expectations, by 
publicly blaming corporate behaviours considered as irresponsible and by entering in a 
collaborative and constructive relationship with the company.  
 
Secondly, this case study highlights the complexity of the corporate decisions related to CSR 
practices and CSR communication. Indeed different types of stakeholders attach importance to 
different CSR issues. They also express different levels of information needs with respect to 
those CSR activities. For instance, IKEA’s customers do not really ask for more information 
about CSR initiatives, while most NGOs and unions are really demanding for more transparent 
and detailed information about those initiatives.  
 
Finally, this paper underlines the central role played by scepticism in the construction of 
CSR-based perceptions and attitudes towards the company. Indeed stakeholders which are not 
engaged in a regular and transparent dialogue and information sharing process with IKEA 
demonstrate more scepticism and develop lower positive attitudes towards the company in 
comparison to other stakeholders benefiting from such a partnership with IKEA. This highlights 
the importance of the communication source and its credibility as well as the importance of the 
structuring of the multi-stakeholders communication process. 
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